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Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions frequently destroy shareholder value, and UK companies 
have a particularly poor record in US deals.  But outcomes are rarely as calamitous as 
in the case of the British electronics group Ferranti which in 1987 entered into a 
significant merger with the US company ISC. The combined group had collapsed by 
1993. Our analysis of the case, seen in the light of more recent corporate failures such 
as the Royal Bank of Scotland, leads us to question whether the UK’s ‘idiosyncratic 
mix’ of corporate governance mechanisms can ever effectively constrain the flawed 
and dictatorial decision-making of dominant individuals. 
 
Keywords: accounting scandals; corporate governance; due diligence; Ferranti; ISC. 
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1. Introduction 
Business history is littered with corporate collapses, which are all the more shocking 
when unexpected. One of the most spectacular and surprising British corporate 
failures of the final quarter of the twentieth century was that of the electronics group 
Ferranti after its merger with the US company International Signal and Control Group 
(ISC), whose accounts concealed a massive and complex fraud.
1
 The case represented 
an example of wider contemporary failures in corporate governance, financial 
reporting and auditing which were manifested in a series of well-known cases in the 
1980s and early 1990s.
2
 These scandals were a catalyst for efforts to improve 
governance, audit and accountability which began with the 1992 Cadbury Report.
3
 
 
Numerous explanations are offered for corporate scandals and collapses, 
particularly in the wake of the wave of significant cases around the turn of the 
millennium in the USA and Europe. Some authors attribute the nature of corporate 
scandals to the characteristics of the countries in which they take place.
4
 Others 
emphasise common themes across countries, some of which resonate strongly with the 
Ferranti case: poor strategic decisions; over-expansion and ill-judged acquisitions; 
dominant senior executives; and internal control failures.
5
  Inadequacies in accounting 
and audit regulation, as well as accounting manipulation and fraud, are often regarded 
as key factors,
6
 and dominant individuals are frequently identified as perpetrators of 
fraud.
7
 Grant and Visconti’s study of 12 major accounting scandals in the USA and 
Europe during the period 2001-2003 identifies two factors which we will encounter in 
the Ferranti case: a mismatch between strategy and the resources and capability of a 
company, particularly in the integration of new activities; and the riskiness of 
expansion into new markets, particularly via US acquisitions or mergers.
8
  A recent 
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article in this journal ‘provides a simple typology of failure’, and identifies ‘three 
types of failing firms … (Icari, Fools and Rogues)’,9 and Ferranti could be argued to 
fall into all of these categories to some extent. 
 
The finance literature sees the market for corporate control as a discipline on 
company managements, with dividends playing a key role in acting as a signal that 
cash flows are not diverted to personal use or negative net present value projects. 
Frequent use of capital markets is also identified as a constraint on managerial 
opportunism and ‘empire-building’.10 On the other hand, there is much evidence that 
mergers and acquisitions, particularly cross-border transactions, destroy shareholder 
value.
11
 Roe suggests that companies exhibit too many post-merger financial and 
operational failures to suggest that takeovers are an effective corporate governance 
remedy.
12
  It is also well-established that UK companies have a poor record in US 
deals in particular.
13
 
 
In this article, while engaging with these literatures, our primary objective is to 
contribute to the debate about the relationship between governance and corporate 
scandals.
14
 We add to that literature by examining the workings and interaction 
between the various governance mechanisms available to companies.
15
 In particular, 
we use the Ferranti case to develop the argument that governance mechanisms aimed 
at protecting shareholders’ interests may prove ineffective even when viewed as 
‘bundles’ rather than in isolation.16 We argue that the issue of corporate governance is, 
in fact, all about the management of conflicts by a company’s board of directors, as 
international corporate governance codes frequently reflect. There are potential 
conflicts between the shareholders of the corporation, the different classes of 
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stakeholders within the company, and with external agencies, such as the government. 
A governance regime that delivers shareholder primacy will require the board to 
promote shareholder interests above those of both other stakeholders such as 
employees, and above those of external parties such as the taxation authorities. The 
role of the board is to balance these conflicting interests, which leads us to highlight 
that the responsibility and accountability of the board is paramount. 
 
In some respects Ferranti was, or appeared to be, an unexceptional company, 
but we argue that its fate was not a case of ‘bad luck’ in choosing the wrong merger 
partner, but reflected failings in its corporate governance arrangements. These 
appeared to conform to contemporary norms, and in formal terms to some extent 
anticipated the reforms which followed this and other major scandals, but we argue 
that on deeper examination the reality was different, as in other cases such as Enron, 
Parmalat and the Royal Bank of Scotland (hereafter, RBS). Above all, Ferranti’s 
corporate governance failed to constrain its executive decision-making, which by the 
time of its merger with ISC had become highly-centralised around Derek Alun-Jones, 
the managing director appointed after the company fell under government control after 
a cash crisis in 1974-75.
17
 Although Alun-Jones was determined to pursue the merger 
for apparently sound strategic reasons, Ferranti was handicapped by its inexperience in 
such transactions, and the minimal nature of and lack of independence in an 
inadequate due diligence process in an era marked by a dramatic increase in merger 
and acquisition activity. The ‘gatekeepers’ of corporate governance – executive and  
non-executive directors (NEDs), institutional investors, auditors and other advisers – 
were all present, and several pre-merger ‘red flags’ were offered to the board, but 
these failed to prevent the disastrous merger. Institutional shareholdings had been 
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widely dispersed when the government’s stake was sold, while Ferranti’s principal 
bankers (National Westminster), who had been represented on the board for several 
decades until the mid-1970s, no longer nominated a director. Ferranti relied heavily on 
ISC’s professional advisers (Peat Marwick McLintock, hereafter PMM, and Robert 
Fleming) and largely accepted its own merchant bankers’ (Barings) analysis of ISC’s 
strength and potential, but all were fooled by a carefully-contrived fiction.  
 
The article starts with a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this 
study in corporate governance. We proceed by explaining Ferranti’s background, its 
merger with ISC and the aftermath, following which we examine its corporate 
governance arrangements, the due diligence process and the role of the various 
accounting firms involved, providing a discussion of our findings and how the case 
links to the corporate governance literature and contemporary and more recent 
corporate governance failures in the final section. Our research has benefitted from 
extensive access to both primary archival material and interviews with as many of 
those involved as possible.
18
 The case has practical relevance to corporate governance 
in developed countries where government ownership of commercial enterprise is 
limited and one-tier board structures dominate.
19
 Crucially, our analysis leads us to 
question whether corporate governance mechanisms, in isolation or combination, can 
ever effectively constrain the flawed and dictatorial decision-making of dominant 
individuals. 
 
2. Theoretical background: corporate governance, the core problem and 
governance mechanisms 
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Corporate governance can be viewed broadly as a set of relationships between the 
board of directors, senior managers and shareholders.
20
 Much of the debate on 
corporate governance follows from the observation that the modern corporation is 
characterised by a divorce between ownership and control, where the functions of 
ownership and management are typically separated, with equity ownership dispersed 
among a large number of shareholders and day-to-day control of the corporation 
delegated to professional managers.
21
 This separation is associated with a corporate 
governance problem, whereby managers do not share the shareholders’ interests, 
which Jensen and Meckling define as an agency issue.
22
 Information asymmetry 
allows incumbent managers to pursue their own objectives, such as increasing 
corporate size, rather than the interests of shareholders, for example, maximising 
company value.
23
  
 
The agency problem, particularly in the publicly-traded corporations within an 
Anglo-Saxon model of governance where opportunism is well-established, has long 
troubled scholars and practitioners.
24
 The agency model offers a variety of governance 
mechanisms that resolve or minimise any manager-shareholder conflict of interests.
25
 
One way of differentiating between governance mechanisms is to refer to them as 
‘internal’ and ‘external’. Internal mechanisms include managerial share ownership, 
which has two effects which can trade off against one another - the alignment of the 
interests of management with those of shareholders and the entrenchment of 
managers,
26
 and oversight by a board of directors.
27
 External mechanisms include 
managerial labour markets,
28
 the existence of large external shareholders,
29
 and the 
market for corporate control,
30
 which acts as a mechanism of last resort.
31
 Dividends 
may also play a role, acting as a commitment mechanism to shareholders, signalling 
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the quality of a company’s earnings and its ability to generate cash, particularly where 
‘true’ earnings may be ‘opaque’, thereby constraining managers who might waste cash 
on ‘empire-building’ and forcing them to overcome a reluctance to incur debt.32 
 
A large body of theoretical and empirical literature on corporate governance 
exists, much of which focuses on the principal-agent relationship, leading to the 
development of hypotheses that explain how various governance mechanisms 
minimise agency costs. Much recent UK corporate governance research has tended to 
concentrate on the internal structural governance mechanisms, such as boards of 
directors and questions of board effectiveness.
33
 The importance and prominence 
accorded to boards has also been visible in corporate governance reforms, as we 
discuss below.  
 
Other scholars have focused on the interrelationship between internal and 
external mechanisms, suggesting that much more needs to be done to improve our 
understanding of how these governance mechanisms complement and/or substitute for 
one another. For example, Rediker and Seth propose that company performance is 
dependent not on any single governance mechanism but on mechanisms in 
combination,
34
 adding that even if the overall combination of mechanisms is effective 
in aligning managerial and shareholder interests, the impact of any single governance 
mechanism may be insufficient to achieve such an alignment. Other authorities also 
highlight evidence which suggests that governance mechanisms are not independent 
of each other,
35
 while Weir et al. argue that different combinations of both internal 
and external governance mechanisms are appropriate for different kinds of companies 
and at different points in their life cycles.
36
 Roe further suggests that, alongside the 
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board of directors and shareholders, other actors such as accountants, lawyers, 
securities analysts and underwriters can monitor, verify and sometimes warrant 
information about a company, concluding that governance mechanisms act as 
complements and substitutes.
37
  
 
Ward et al. suggest that a company’s (poor) performance can prompt external 
shareholders to monitor more carefully, thereby complementing internal monitoring.
38
 
They also assume that poor performance is likely to amplify the divergence of 
managerial and shareholder interests, thus increasing the need for external shareholder 
control and monitoring, rather than relying on incentives. Equally, if a company is 
doing well, there is little external pressure on the board to change the way it runs the 
company; shareholders are unlikely to be concerned about governance issues if their 
expected return on investment is not threatened, especially where ownership is widely 
dispersed, creating a ‘free rider’ problem. In such circumstances, the board of 
directors becomes crucial in establishing appropriate governance structures.  
 
Grounded in these theoretical expositions, Ferranti represents an interesting 
case to examine, given its good performance, apparently sound strategic reasons for 
merger, and internal governance arrangements which seemed to adhere to 
contemporary good, or even best, practice. In the following sections, after presenting 
an account of Ferranti’s merger with ISC and its aftermath, we outline the workings 
of, and interaction between, the internal and external governance mechanisms that 
contributed to its failure, benchmarking these against wider contemporary practice. 
 
3. Ferranti background and strategy 
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3.1 The ‘Ferranti spirit’ and government control 
Ferranti was a large, long-established and (until 1975) family-controlled firm which 
enjoyed remarkable longevity by the standards of British companies and illustrated 
‘the continuing commitment to personal capitalism in British industry’ of which 
Chandler was so critical.
39
 By the 1970s its main business was defence electronics, 
accounting for around 70% of its profits and 65% of its sales, having developed a 
range of avionic equipment that was used extensively in several generations of British 
and other military aircraft. While its civil businesses were never as successful 
commercially, Ferranti had a buoyant computer business that focused on real-time 
applications in manufacturing and traffic control. By the 1970s, Ferranti had a 
reputation for enduring technological innovation, driven on by a family that preferred 
to reinvest the bulk of the firm’s earnings into research and development. This 
management tradition, ‘the Ferranti spirit’, which emphasised innovation and 
engineering excellence in a decentralised group structure, proved remarkably durable, 
and the founder’s grandsons, Sebastian and Basil de Ferranti (hereafter referred to 
simply as ‘Sebastian’ and ‘Basil’) still held 56% of the equity in 1974.40 Sebastian 
described the ‘Ferranti spirit’ as: ‘... managing innovative teams of engineers in 
separate product-based departments, with considerable independence’.41 This 
approach was reflected in the company’s control and decision-making processes, 
although it would be incorrect to characterise Ferranti’s internal reporting systems as 
unsophisticated.
42
  The ‘Ferranti spirit’ provoked mixed views: the Economist noted 
that ‘Ferranti has frequently been criticised for lack of commercial bite, with too many 
professional engineers on the board but weak financial control.  It has always known 
how to innovate, and which innovations to back. It has also known when to get out’.43 
The Ferranti family resisted all attempts to introduce more formalised structures, 
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arguing that financial controllers would inhibit their innovative tendencies,
44
 despite 
crises earlier in the company’s life: a financial crisis in 1903 which led to the family 
losing operational control until 1928; another crisis in 1956; and the Bloodhound 
scandal in the 1960s, when massive cost overruns on a missile project illustrated the 
difficulties of reconciling innovation and cost control.
45
  
 
Government control was accepted as a condition of financial assistance when 
Ferranti experienced a severe liquidity crisis in 1974-75, precipitated by the refusal of 
its main bankers, National Westminster, to increase its overdraft limit.
46
 The 
government guaranteed £11 million of borrowings and took 50% of the voting shares 
and 62.5% of the equity in exchange for a total of £15 million, including a loan of 
£6.3 million, with its investment later transferred to the National Enterprise Board 
(NEB), a holding company established in 1975.
47
 Sebastian and Basil, managing 
director/executive chairman and deputy managing director respectively, were obliged 
to move into non-executive positions, to be replaced by Derek Alun-Jones, a former 
executive at the oil company Burmah, who became chief executive in 1975 after a 
lengthy executive search exercise.
48
 Given the firm’s poor financial performance, ‘the 
focus in the early days on financial ratios, cash flow and short-term financial 
performance was inevitable’.49 Maurice Elderfield joined from the Post Office as 
Ferranti’s first finance director in November 1976, introducing stronger accounting 
and financial controls in the highly devolved business. In addition, apart from selling 
the loss-making Canadian subsidiary for £7 million in 1979, new funding sources 
were sought. The largest of these was an £18 million syndicated loan arranged by 
Chase Manhattan which was used to repay the NEB loan and reduce the National 
Westminster overdraft.
50
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Ferranti was refloated on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) on 28 September 
1978, by which time it had returned to making reasonable profits. Although the NEB 
retained its 50% holding, this stake was eventually widely distributed in August 1980, 
when it ‘disposed of almost all of its 50 per cent stockholding in the company by 
means of a placing with more than one hundred institutional shareholders’.51 This 
form of disposal might not have maximised the NEB’s proceeds, but was deliberately 
undertaken to avoid the threat to Ferranti’s independence that might have come from a 
concentration of large block shareholders or sale to a single buyer.
52
 The sale was 
accompanied by a rights issue which raised nearly £21 million and left Ferranti 
virtually debt-free, a status it retained until the 1987 merger with ISC. 
 
Ferranti’s escape from state control significantly enhanced Alun-Jones’ 
reputation, both across the City and especially within the firm. By 1980 his fellow-
directors regarded him as Ferranti’s ‘saviour’, which strengthened his hold over its 
decision-making processes and effectively ensured that he had total control over 
resources and strategy. In spite of its solvent position in 1980, Ferranti’s small size 
relative to other electronics and defence companies represented a major strategic 
challenge, even though it was an important but not top-tier defence contractor.
53
 This 
prompted extensive internal fears of a possible takeover by major British companies 
such as the General Electric Company (GEC), Racal and Standard Telephone and 
Cables (STC), especially when another potential predator, Plessey, was itself being 
threatened by GEC.
54
 This fear of being taken over was a principal motivation behind 
the strategy that Alun-Jones devised in the mid-1980s, using his powerful position 
within the board to persuade his fellow-directors to follow his lead.   His preferred 
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solution was to develop a stronger position in the USA, devoting considerable 
management and financial resources (amounting to $50 million) to ‘The US 
Strategy’.55 However, with Ferranti’s sales in the USA and Canada less than 10% of 
total sales in 1986-87,
56
 Alun-Jones pursued the more radical option of merger with 
ISC. 
 
3.2 The ISC merger 
ISC was created in 1971 as an American corporation, based in Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania, where its principal figure, James Guerin, built an extensive reputation 
for philanthropic activity. It was floated on the LSE in 1982, a year that also marked 
its first collaboration with Ferranti on various joint products. Its merger with Ferranti 
was announced on 21 September 1987 and completed on 16 November 1987 as an all-
share offer to ISC shareholders, who received approximately 41% of the combined 
entity.
57
 The resulting company, Ferranti International, was a substantial operation, 
with employee numbers peaking at 24,818 and annual turnover approaching £1 billion 
by 1987-88.
58
 Ferranti believed that ISC would be an entrepreneurial partner in the 
rapidly-changing defence market which provided most of Ferranti’s revenues. Smaller 
than Ferranti, ISC certainly appeared to be a good strategic fit, offering access to 
geographical (the Middle East) and product (guided missiles) markets in which 
Ferranti was either weak or from which it was absent at a time when changes in UK 
defence procurement threatened to undermine its business.
59
 
 
Market and investor reactions to the merger were generally favourable to its 
representation as an excellent combination of American marketing and British 
engineering expertise, offering shareholders the potential for rich rewards as long as 
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the existing management was retained.
60
 Sebastian, however, no longer a Ferranti 
director but still a major shareholder with 3.6% of the company, opposed the deal.
61
 
He commissioned an independent report that was sceptical of ISC’s structure, product 
range and operations,
62
 even though the City of London regarded the merger as highly 
credible.
63
 While Sebastian failed to make this report available to the Ferranti board, it 
is unlikely that it would have prevented the merger, given the total support Alun-Jones 
had from his fellow-directors.
64
 After the merger Ferranti granted a high degree of 
autonomy to ISC, and specifically to Guerin. Moreover, Ferranti was obliged to allow 
the continuation of ‘shadow board’ arrangements for the ISC business to overcome 
possible US objections to the merger of a defence contractor with a larger foreign 
company. While this could be interpreted as a further manifestation of the ‘Ferranti 
spirit’ of allowing entrepreneurial managers to develop businesses,65 Guerin was able 
to run ISC much as he had done prior to the merger. The board of the merged 
company expanded to include six ISC directors, two of whom were NEDs, and 
unusually, included the finance director of a subsidiary (ISC’s Zillgen).66 
 
3.3 Aftermath of the merger 
In spite of the plaudits Alun-Jones received for arranging the merger, extending his 
City reputation even further and reinforcing his internal power base, it proved to be a 
disaster and by 1993 the group had been dismantled through restructuring and trade 
sales. This crisis started in 1989, when a massive fraud at ISC was exposed.
67
 At the 
root of this fraud was a series of missile contracts, some real but others wholly 
fictitious, on which false and/or premature revenues had been booked prior to the 
merger, thereby boosting ISC’s reported performance. Integral to the fraud were ‘front 
companies’ and offshore private bank accounts in the Bahamas, Panama and 
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Switzerland, through which cash was churned to create the appearance of legitimate 
contracts, a charade that took Ferranti management over two years to unravel. Guerin 
received a fifteen-year jail sentence in the USA in 1992 for both masterminding the 
fraud and illegal arms trading, all of which he denied.
68
 His ‘veil of integrity’, created 
by his apparently successful business activities and his local philanthropy, is common 
to many fraudsters, from Donald Coster of McKesson & Robbins to Parmalat’s 
Calisto Tanzi.
69
 When Ferranti International’s 1989 accounts were revised to reflect 
the effects of the fraud, shareholders’ funds were nearly halved from the initially-
reported £369 million to £193 million, after writing off the carrying value of suspect 
contracts, the fictitious profits which had been recognised, and other adjustments.
70
 
Alun-Jones left Ferranti in 1990. 
 
In the short term, Ferranti International was able to secure adequate bank 
support to withstand an immediate liquidity crisis, but a condition of these loans was 
substantial asset sales. The most important was GEC’s acquisition of the Ferranti 
Defence Systems business and half the Italian operation for £300 million in 1990, with 
the price reduced by £33 million in 1992 due to an overvaluation of stock.
71
 This deal 
had political approval, because Ferranti was supplying advanced equipment for the 
European Fighter Aircraft.
72
 A rights issue in August 1990 raised £43.5 million after 
expenses, while an out-of-court settlement with PMM yielded £40 million.
73
 
Nevertheless, the remaining operations were absorbing these cash inflows and the 
company was in a downward spiral, struggling to repay its debts, meet redundancy and 
other restructuring costs, and settle contractual claims. The group fell into receivership 
in 1993, providing GEC with the opportunity to acquire the remaining assets in 
1994.
74
 Ferranti’s failure led to precisely the situation it had sought to avoid, with 
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GEC able to ‘cherry pick’ its most important businesses, arguably an appropriate 
industrial solution but without the need for a full takeover and avoiding intense 
scrutiny from the competition authorities. 
 
Alun-Jones had defended the merger decision, claiming that: 
 
... no warning of any irregularities, or even of suspicions of irregularities, in 
relation to the conduct of ISC’s business prior to the merger was given by any 
official source either in the UK or USA or by City interests.  Nor was anything 
known by the company of any investigations, actual or pending, of ISC or any 
individual connected with ISC.
75
 
 
Any pre-merger doubts that Ferranti may have had about ISC appear to have 
been limited to concerns about ‘aggressive accounting’ over revenue recognition 
(effectively the ‘front-ending’ of profits on contracts), rather than outright fraud.76 But 
notwithstanding the statement of Alun-Jones, Ferranti’s management had ignored 
numerous pre-merger ‘red flags’ about ISC. Viewed in combination these ought 
reasonably to have raised serious doubts over the wisdom of the transaction, or at the 
very least suggested the need for Ferranti to assert its control over ISC at an early 
stage. One ‘red flag’ was ISC’s LSE-listing, given that there were many defence 
technology companies listed in the USA, with its much broader and deeper stock 
markets, which were arguably more heavily regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
77
 Of course, ISC would not have been alone among London-listed 
defence and electronics companies in producing opaque accounts in this period. For 
example, both editions of Terry Smith’s well-known book identify British Aerospace, 
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another PMM audit client, as one of the heaviest users of ‘creative accounting’ 
techniques in the early 1990s, and the annual reviews of financial reporting practice 
published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
use this company to illustrate the difficulties in accounting for areas such as launch 
costs and contingencies.
78
 These same sources give no indication of accounting 
problems at Ferranti before the merger.
79
  
 
Other ‘red flags’, however, were waved and ignored. Ferranti’s own internal 
review of ISC showed that it lacked managerial and engineering depth and highlighted 
two key risks: ‘Dominance of a small number of major customers/contracts ... [and] 
Dependence on outside suppliers’.80 There were also verbal warnings from a junior 
defence minister and a senior civil servant, mostly in relation to the Middle East 
customers on which ISC relied for the bulk of its income and profit.
81
 Finally, United 
Chem-Con, a company with links to Guerin and ISC, was under investigation for 
fraudulent management of state contracts before the merger, while the absence of an 
American predator for ISC could also have been considered a negative signal.
82
 
 
4. Corporate governance arrangements at Ferranti 
Sir David Walker’s review of governance in financial institutions in the wake of the 
2007-08 financial crisis comments that the ‘idiosyncratic mix’ of ‘arrangements for 
corporate governance in the UK reflect an amalgam of primary legislation, 
prescriptive rules, “comply or explain” codes of best practice, custom and market 
incentive’.83 Corporate governance standards in the 1980s were weaker, and 
improvements came only after the ISC fraud. There were also fewer constraints on 
accounting manipulation, while financial reporting and auditing standards were much 
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less well-developed, and the regulation of the accounting and auditing professions was 
largely in the hands of the relevant professional bodies. The Financial Reporting 
Council and its main subsidiary bodies, the Accounting Standards Board and the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel, were only created in 1991. 
 
A series of reports focused on governance mechanisms in publicly-listed 
companies
84
 and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (now the UK 
Corporate Governance Code
85
) eventually emerged, with an initial emphasis on board 
structures which later evolved to emphasise independence and then behaviour.
86
 
International corporate governance recommendations attach similar importance to the 
board of directors. The current UK Corporate Governance Code suggests that ‘the 
board should set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and 
human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives and review 
management performance’ and emphasises the need ‘to ensure effective engagement 
with key stakeholders … in order to deliver business strategy’.87 
 
Ferranti’s formal board structure anticipated the major recommendations of the 
first UK governance report, the Cadbury Report: the roles of chairman and chief 
executive were separate; the number of NEDs exceeded the recommended minimum 
of three; and an audit committee existed.
88
 On the other hand, this apparent 
compliance with contemporary best practice did not extend to the later emphasis on 
independence, behaviour, and accountability – aspects of governance which are harder 
to codify or regulate. Other governance mechanisms which might have compensated 
for these shortcomings were bypassed or absent. 
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4.1 The board: composition, internal shareholdings and audit committee 
Five of Ferranti’s nine directors when the company refloated in September 1978 
remained at the time of the merger, averaging 17 years’ experience as Ferranti 
directors (or 14 years’ if Basil is disregarded). Alun-Jones was a relatively long-
serving chief executive with 12 years’ service, more than double the average tenure at 
that time.
89
 The executive directors, two of whom had only just joined the board, were 
mostly divisional ‘barons’ averaging over 20 years’ service with the firm.90 
 
Directors’ shareholdings at Ferranti prior to the merger were untypically low 
for UK-listed firms. One study, which excluded financial institutions, privatised and 
regulated companies, found that mean ownership by directors and their immediate 
families was 13.34% in 1988.
91
 Another study, based on a random sample of 460 
publicly-traded industrial companies in the period 1989-92, revealed average top 
executive share ownership of 2.23% and board ownership of 10.7%.
92
 Table 1 shows, 
however, that the personal shareholdings of Ferranti’s executive directors were small 
until Guerin joined the board after the merger, and Alun-Jones never held as much as 
0.5% of the equity after 1980. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
It is important to stress that the principal function of NEDs is to ensure that the 
executive directors pursue policies that are consistent with shareholders’ interests.93 
The Cadbury Report recommended that: ‘the calibre and number of non-executive 
directors on a board should be such that their views will carry significant weight in the 
board’s decisions’.94 Abdullah and Page argue that: 
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The concern for corporate governance that gave rise to the Cadbury Committee 
... was not so much that companies were performing inadequately but that 
there were unacceptable risks if boards controlled by executive directors or 
dominant CEOs were not balanced by the presence of non-executive 
directors.
95
  
 
Ferranti’s problem was that there was no effective counter-balance to Alun-
Jones’s dominance. The four NEDs at the time of the merger were Basil, Robin 
Broadley, Sir John Hoskyns and Gavin Boyd. Broadley was a director of the 
company’s merchant banking advisor, Barings, as well as a NED at Royal Insurance 
(as was Alun-Jones) and Blue Circle.
96
 His professional relationship with Alun-Jones 
dated back to the latter’s days at Burmah.97 Sebastian considered that Broadley 
represented ‘City interests’, leading him to oppose Broadley’s appointment to the 
board in 1981. This was one factor in Sebastian’s isolation which led to his departure 
shortly afterwards and his replacement as chairman by Basil.
98
 Boyd had been a NED 
since the mid-1970s crisis, while Hoskyns was a recent arrival on the board. Ferranti’s 
NEDs were certainly of sufficient ‘calibre and number’, but other than the well-
known, respected and politically-connected Hoskyns they either lacked independence 
or in Basil’s case had been marginalised.99 Institutional investors and bank lenders 
were not directly represented on the board. 
 
Although there is no legal distinction between executive directors and NEDs, 
the roles of the latter and the company chairman have evolved considerably since the 
1980s and are now well-defined. In that respect, Basil did not offer the kind of board 
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leadership currently envisaged from the chairman, largely because Alun-Jones ensured 
that he was marginalised. NEDs are expected to contribute to the development of 
strategy, the monitoring of performance and the management of risk. In particular, the 
audit committee, a board sub-committee consisting of NEDs expected to oversee, 
amongst other things, the audit process, is now a well-established governance 
mechanism, but was less common in the 1980s.
100
 Pressure on listed companies to 
establish audit committees was exerted by PRONED (‘Promotion of Non-executive 
Directors’), an organisation established in 1981 and supported by the Bank of England 
and various City institutions, including the LSE.
101
 Ferranti’s Annual Reports are 
silent on the existence of an audit committee until 1988, after which they show its 
existence and membership, but do not discuss why it was established, its activities or 
the frequency of its meetings. The Joint Disciplinary Scheme report on PMM notes 
that two of the major fictitious contracts featured in memoranda from PMM to the 
audit committee in 1988 and 1989,
102
 but we can find no other evidence of the 
committee’s activities.103 This is consistent with Collier’s broader conclusion from the 
mid-1990s, ‘that there is little evidence to show that audit committees are effective, 
and ... the widespread adoption of audit committees in the UK might well reflect no 
more than an attempt to avoid legislative solutions to deficiencies in corporate 
governance’.104 
 
The Bank of England conducted a series of studies on the composition of 
boards of directors in support of PRONED. The 1988 study, based on questionnaires 
sent to the Times 1000 companies, was conducted closest to the date of the merger, 
providing a useful benchmark against which to compare the Ferranti board (see Table 
2). These studies suggest that Ferranti’s board was not unusual in size and 
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composition, with a typical balance between executive and non-executive directors, 
while it was quite common to have an audit committee and a chairman with executive 
responsibilities. There were only 199 directors with professional connections in 549 
companies surveyed. We have no data to show how many were merchant bankers, but 
it seems reasonable to presume that only a small proportion would have been, 
indicating that while Ferranti may not have been unusual in having a merchant banker 
as a NED, it was not the norm. A separate academic study produced broadly similar 
results on the composition of boards of listed companies in 1988, and revealed a clear 
shift towards meeting the Cadbury recommendations by 1993.
105
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4.2 Audit and due diligence 
While corporate failures frequently prompt the cry ‘where were the auditors?’, such 
events do not necessarily imply ‘audit failure’, which is considered to be relatively 
rare.
106
 The presence of a major audit firm is typically regarded as a signal of quality 
in a company’s financial statements, although the direction of causality can be 
difficult to establish - those clients which choose major audit firms may be those less 
likely to practise accounting manipulation, rather than major firm auditors being more 
effective at detecting and preventing manipulation.
107
 Nor does the presence of a 
major audit firm guarantee that the auditor will counter accounting manipulation when 
aware of it.
108
 Indeed, we note that virtually all of the major corporate scandals around 
the turn of the millennium featured major firm auditors. 
 
Grant Thornton (Thornton Baker before a 1986 merger), Ferranti’s long-
standing auditor, was sometimes referred to (in a slightly condescending way) as ‘the 
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Manchester firm’, but remained auditor until the final collapse in 1993. At times, 
other large accounting firms were involved at Ferranti: Price Waterhouse acted with 
Thornton Baker as joint reporting accountants for the 1978 listing, while after the 
merger PMM were joint auditors in 1988 and 1989. Grant Thornton regained the role 
as sole auditor from 1990 after PMM’s resignation, following the publication of 
reissued financial statements to reflect the ISC fraud, after extensive work by Coopers 
and Lybrand.
109
 The profession’s investigation noted that: ‘Grant Thornton conducted 
a thorough review of PMM’s audit work [for 1988] and were satisfied with it’, 
concluding that PMM’s ‘audit work was reasonable ... [and] that PMM were among 
those comprehensively deceived by a fraud which was designed and executed with 
extraordinary skill and care’. The report noted that PMM were familiar with ISC’s use 
of front companies prior to ISC’s 1982 flotation,110 but the firm was not subject to the 
criticism and penalties extended to auditors in some other UK scandals of the 
period.
111
 
 
While auditor responsibility in relation to fraud was established in the 
nineteenth century,
112
 ‘the importance of fraud detection as an audit objective was 
steadily eroded’ and professional standards were tightened to impose greater 
responsibilities on auditors in this area only after the Ferranti case.
113
 It is also 
important to distinguish financial statement audits from other types of work which 
auditing firms might undertake, such as due diligence and forensic audits. 
 
The Ferranti case illustrates the risk in corporate transactions: ‘Not to look 
carefully behind the accounts, as opposed to merely looking at them, is to invite 
disappointment or worse’.114 In hindsight, it is clear that Ferranti lacked sufficient 
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knowledge of its target and the due diligence undertaken in respect of the merger 
proved inadequate. One should also stress that Ferranti had little experience of major 
corporate transactions, lacking the skills and structure to assess and absorb ISC 
effectively. Prior to the merger, which valued ISC at £411 million, Ferranti’s single 
largest acquisition had been of TRW Controls in 1984 for $10 million. Ferranti had 
fewer than 50 managers at the centre and ‘no audit teams or financial analysts at the 
centre ready to go out on assignment’.115 Although Ferranti created a team at its 
corporate headquarters in Millbank Tower, London, this was composed mostly of 
engineers and lacked the financial expertise to unravel a highly sophisticated 
accounting fraud. This contrasted to the resources that acquisitive British companies 
in the 1980s such as Hanson Trust would deploy in ‘a few months of hands-on 
transitional management’ in the integration process.116 The Anglo-Dutch 
multinational Unilever, a very different type of company, also demonstrated the 
importance of organisational learning, developing its skills to become ‘a formidable 
acquirer of firms’.117 
 
Ferranti’s due diligence prior to the merger appears to have consisted of its 
own internal review,
118
 which was made up of around a dozen pages, plus copies of 
three pages of information from ISC’s financial statements, and a forty-page research 
report prepared by ISC’s merchant bankers, Robert Fleming & Co, in September 
1986. Specialist guides cite the Ferranti case as a turning point in due diligence 
practice,
119
 but the questions of what constitutes due diligence and what would have 
been reasonable in the Ferranti-ISC merger are not straightforward. 
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Guidance issued by the ICAEW described due diligence as ‘an investigation 
into the affairs of an entity ... prior to its acquisition, flotation, restructuring or other 
similar transaction’, falling into three overlapping categories: financial, legal and 
commercial.
120
 Howson sees financial and commercial due diligence as 
complementary, offering a strategic view of due diligence based on three key aspects: 
‘an understanding of market attractiveness, ability to compete and management’s 
ability to deliver’.121 Beattie et al., based on interviews with finance directors and 
audit engagement partners in 1996-97, reinforce the impression given in the ICAEW’s 
guidance that due diligence practice varies greatly.
122
 They found that it is at times a 
joint effort by an acquirer and its auditor, often undertaken by only one of these, and 
that its extent depended on factors such as the size of target, the speed with which a 
transaction is to be completed, and whether a target is listed, in which case only 
publicly available information might be used, particularly in a ‘hostile’ transaction.123 
 
Evidence from companies other than Ferranti tends to reinforce these 
impressions. For example, Jones’s study of Unilever found that: ‘In practice, 
acquisitions remained an instinctive and subjective affair’.124 The official report on the 
failure of RBS noted in relation to its acquisition of part of the Dutch bank ABN 
Amro that ‘there are no codes or standards against which to judge whether due 
diligence is adequate, and given that, the limited due diligence which RBS conducted 
was typical of contested takeovers’.125 It is relatively rare, however, for due diligence 
processes to generate issues which obstruct a takeover or merger, the case of the bid 
for Pergamon Press by Leasco in 1968 being a particularly well-known example.
126
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The ‘friendly’ nature of the Ferranti-ISC merger suggests that there were 
conflicting influences on the nature and extent of due diligence - the potential for 
easier access to information but less need for due diligence due to ISC’s listed status 
and the companies’ experience of one another. On the other hand, Ferranti’s approach 
certainly seemed less robust than that of GEC, which targeted the key issue: ‘Guerin 
had first approached GEC as a potential partner. The deal was examined by [managing 
director Arnold] Weinstock’s number two ... who had the good sense to send Guerin 
packing after he failed to disclose details of ISC’s main contracts’.127 
 
4.3 The City, dividend pressures, equity investors and debtholders 
The Ferranti case must, of course, be examined in the context of the environment in 
which the scandal took place. The City of London changed in the 1980s with the 
changes to the LSE referred to as ‘Big Bang’, the take-off of derivatives trading on the 
London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), and the dramatic increase 
in initial and secondary equity offerings and merger and acquisition activity from 1983 
to 1989, partly driven by the government’s privatisation programme and a large 
number of aggressive contested takeovers.
128
 In each of the years from 1985 to 1988, 
the number of initial offerings exceeded 100, a level not reached in any other year 
after World War One, having recovered from single-figure numbers in several years in 
the 1970s.
129
  In this feverish atmosphere scandals emerged, as did complaints of City 
investors’ short-termism, and the inadequacy, or excessive cost and bureaucracy, of 
the new self-regulatory regime.
130
  
 
Toms and Wright have suggested that during this period ‘shareholder voice’ 
was enhanced by ‘... the development of global capital markets, secondary tier capital 
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markets and developments in the market for corporate control ... increases in 
institutional share ownership and activism and the development of venture capital 
firms and management buy-outs’.131 In the UK institutional shareholdings continued 
their long-term rise through the 1980s: personal ownership of shares fell from 39.8% 
in 1975 to 23.4% in 1989, while ownership by financial institutions and overseas 
investors rose from 48.1% to 58.7% and 5.6% to 12.4%, respectively.
132
 At Ferranti 
Sebastian and Basil were the largest shareholders, but both reduced their holdings 
significantly in the 1980s (see Table 1) and the wide dispersal of Ferranti 
shareholdings amongst financial institutions remained the major feature of its 
ownership structure. 
   
Dividend policy, as a signal of corporate performance, can be regarded as 
particularly important in a company such as Ferranti, with long-term contracts of 
sometimes uncertain value, a concentration of customers, uncertainties over 
technology and a history of financial instability. Average dividend pay-out ratios for 
UK-listed companies returned to around 45% of post-tax profits in the 1980s, similar 
to the 1960s, having fallen to around 30% in the inflationary 1970s.
133
 Indeed, the 
1980s showed the highest real dividend growth (4.8% per year) since the 1950s and 
the highest real annual returns on UK equities (15.4%) for any decade in the twentieth 
century.
134
  
 
It is important to highlight the role played by merchant banks in fashioning 
both dividend and investment policies, as this was a prominent feature of the British 
business scene.
135
 In the Ferranti case, the merchant bank influence appears to have 
been felt through Broadley’s presence on the board, rather than Barings’ influence as 
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an investor. Broadley encouraged a progressive dividend policy to retain shareholder 
loyalty and minimise the possibility that Ferranti would be a potential bid target.
136
 
Although Ferranti’s dividend pay-out ratio was not high compared to the UK average, 
its dividends grew rapidly (see Table 1).  Effectively, Ferranti was raising dividends at 
a rate sufficient to satisfy shareholders, while signalling its financial conservatism by 
paying out a smaller proportion of profits than the typical UK-listed company and 
carrying relatively little debt. 
 
The emphasis in UK governance regulation on the role of shareholder 
intervention, particularly active shareholder engagement with investee companies, 
originated in the 1992 Cadbury Report,
137
 and is now reflected in the Stewardship 
Code,
138
 a product of the recent financial crisis. Such investor engagement appears to 
have been absent at Ferranti, yet Ferranti’s shareholders had no reason to challenge the 
merger with ISC. The ‘exit, voice, or loyalty’ question therefore never arose,139 given 
that there was no slow or steady decline to signal difficulties and no additional cash 
was raised to fund the merger. As no significant share issues took place after the sale 
of the NEB stake in 1980, shareholders had therefore not been asked to provide any 
new money for several years. The largest shareholder at the time of the merger, and 
the only one with more than 5% of Ferranti’s issued share capital, was the non-
executive chairman, Basil.
140
 Ferranti’s ownership was widely dispersed, even by the 
standards of Britain’s ‘outsider’ system, and lacked the institutional block 
shareholdings of the size identified by various authors.
141
 Overall, the Ferranti case 
does not appear to reflect investor ‘short-termism’, but represents another example of 
investors’ arm’s length approach in the face of apparently satisfactory corporate 
performance. This was also a feature of two other notable British industrial failures in 
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the 1960s and 1970s, British Motor Corporation and Rolls Royce,
142
 and various UK 
official reports have reinforced this argument.
143
 
 
Another important factor in the Ferranti case was the company’s use of 
syndicated loan and leasing facilities. This reflected wider trends in corporate finance, 
but could be considered to have weakened lender influence in a manner comparable to 
the fragmentation of the shareholder base. In addition, Ferranti’s main bankers had 
been represented on the board for decades,
144
 but were noticeable by their absence by 
the 1980s.  Although National Westminster had been criticised as an ineffective 
monitor before the 1970s crisis,
145
 the bank could have provided some constraint on 
the company, given that by 1987 the absence of any lender representation on the board 
offered none. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In the light of recent and persistent corporate failures and corporate governance 
scandals, this article is offered as a timely contribution to scholarly research and 
practical interest in understanding the workings of corporate governance mechanisms, 
and specifically how they can lead to failures to constrain poor executive decision-
making. We contribute to the literature that recognises the complexity associated with 
corporate governance structures and arrangements, especially focusing on the 
workings of, and interrelationship between, internal and external governance 
mechanisms, including the relatively unexplored area of due diligence.
146
 Rediker and 
Seth have argued that even if the overall combination of governance mechanisms is 
effective in aligning managerial and shareholder interests, the impact of any one 
governance mechanism may be insufficient to achieve such an alignment.
147
 Similarly, 
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Ward et al. propose that if a company is doing well, there is little external pressure on 
the board for any changes in the way it functions.
148
 Shareholders are unlikely to be 
concerned about governance issues if their expected return on investment is not 
threatened. In such circumstances, the role of the board of directors becomes crucial in 
establishing appropriate governance structures.  
 
We find that Ferranti’s case reflects this scenario: the company’s performance 
was reasonable, it had apparently sound strategic reasons for merger and its 
governance arrangements seemed to adhere to contemporary norms. The widely-
dispersed shareholders therefore had no reasons to monitor and challenge the board’s 
strategic decisions. This in turn gave the board discretion over establishing appropriate 
due diligence processes and governance arrangements, even if these proved to be 
dysfunctional.
149
 
 
Of course, it would be possible to analyse the Ferranti case as a story of two 
dominant individuals: Alun-Jones and Guerin. However, many of the corporate 
governance issues prominent in this case have been the focus of criticisms in recent 
official reports - the regulatory report on RBS; a House of Commons report; and Sir 
David Walker’s review of governance in financial institutions.150 Indeed, Alun-
Jones’s 1989 defence of the merger quoted earlier echoes the reaction of banking 
witnesses to the House of Commons enquiry, who ‘betrayed a degree of self-pity, 
portraying themselves as the unlucky victims of external circumstances’.151 
 
Ferranti’s desire, or even desperation, to retain its independence, and to a 
lesser extent sustain ‘the Ferranti spirit’ in a changing market, was instrumental in its 
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downfall. Above all, Alun-Jones wanted to shift the strategic direction of the company 
to the USA, and he drove through the switch to US acquisitions, as well as the sell-
offs of the traditional Ferranti meter, transformer and microelectronics businesses, 
decisions that the board ratified unanimously.
152
 Moreover, the consolidation of power 
around a professional manager, rather than family owners, appears to have made 
Ferranti a US-style company with an entrenched chief executive, a situation which 
contributed significantly to its demise. While previous crises had effectively given 
control of the company for various periods to its bankers and the government, the 
wide dispersion of share ownership after 1980 left most shareholders with little 
incentive to monitor management decisions. The shareholders who knew the company 
best, Sebastian and Basil, had been marginalised by the time of the decision to merge 
with ISC. Indeed, Sebastian had been manoeuvred into resignation from the board, 
while Basil had no executive role, Alun-Jones having persuaded the other directors, 
who had virtually no ‘skin in the game’ through their own share ownership, to support 
his strategies.
153
 
 
Although Ferranti avoided becoming a direct victim of the financialisation for 
which the UK is often criticised,
154
 the firm suffered a different fate with Alun-Jones 
able to exert his dominance over the company and its board. This contrasts with the 
views expressed in the ‘law and finance’ literature, which, while subject to severe 
criticism, argues that the UK’s system to protect the interests of investors is strong.155 
Consequently, the Ferranti case offers support for both those who would argue for 
greater emphasis on board accountability and responsibility to monitor the chief 
executive and those who would prefer the market to take a more active role. While the 
Cadbury Report and later reforms appear to have had an impact on governance 
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arrangements in listed companies, very similar problems to those evident at Ferranti 
played a major part in Britain’s 2007-08 financial crisis after a decade and a half of 
reforms. 
 
Our analysis of the Ferranti case therefore resonates with several current 
corporate governance debates: the appointment, expertise, independence and role of 
NEDs; the need to curb authoritarian chief executives; the monitoring role of 
institutional shareholders; the expectations placed on auditors; and the reputational 
role of ‘big’ audit firms. Ferranti’s failings share various elements with recurring 
critiques of the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. As Jensen has argued, ‘few 
[chief executives] will accept, much less seek, the monitoring and criticism of an 
active and attentive board’,156 compounding factors such as the chief executive’s 
ability to determine the flow of information to the board and its agenda, the lack of 
substantial equity interests of executive and non-executive board members, the 
combination of chairman and chief executive roles, and the absence or curbing of 
active investors with sufficiently large positions to monitor and influence a company. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, the House of Commons Treasury Committee and 
the Walker Review were particularly critical of both the failure of NEDs to exercise 
effective oversight and challenge managers, and the failure of institutional investors to 
hold boards and managements to account.
157
 
 
The chairman of the Financial Reporting Council has claimed that: ‘The UK 
Corporate Governance Code … has made a big difference to corporate governance 
standards and practice in the UK … [and] has a history of success in pushing out the 
boundaries of best practice’.158 On the other hand, over the past twenty-five years we 
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have also seen an unending stream of criticism of corporate culture, financial markets 
and indeed capitalism itself; reports and codes of practice have proliferated, but there 
is very little to show for all this activity, particularly in relation to board responsibility 
and accountability.  
The Ferranti case and more recent experiences reinforce our view that 
corporate governance mechanisms, whether code-based or not, and whether in 
combination or isolation, might never effectively constrain the flawed and dictatorial 
decision-making of dominant individuals. Such cases therefore lend further weight to 
the need to develop greater understanding of how governance mechanisms interrelate 
and impact in particular circumstances. In other words, a particular governance 
structure may be appropriate for a given company in one situation, but not in others.
159
 
We consequently concur with Hannah’s succinct assessment, that ‘ensuring that 
companies are governed by wise, honest, trustworthy, reputable, transparent, 
professional, informed, shrewd, and correctly motivated directors is not a simple 
problem to which we know the answer’.160 
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Table 1. Ferranti: shareholdings, gearing and dividends, selected years. 
 1978 1980 1981 1982 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Panel A: Percentage of issued shares held         
         
Directors’ shareholdings1         
All directors 27.77 18.76 14.72 7.47 5.85 5.45 5.42 7.62 
Sebastian and Basil de Ferranti
2
 27.07 18.39 14.46 7.24 5.69 5.29 5.25 3.01 
All non-executive directors 27.08 18.41 14.47 7.26 5.70 5.31 5.27 3.03 
All executive directors 0.69 0.35 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.15 4.59 
Derek Alun-Jones 0.63 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.07 
All ex-ISC directors        4.50 
James Guerin        4.40 
         
Non-director shareholdings greater than 5%         
National Enterprise Board 50.00 50.00       
Abercorn Nominees Ltd
3 
6.36        
Sebastian de Ferranti
2 
   6.60     
Guardian Royal Exchange plc        5.40 
         
Panel B: Financial ratios         
         
Gearing (%) 30 32 23 -1 -4 13 14 10 
Dividend payout ratio (%) 10 17 33 19 26 23 27 27 
Index of ordinary dividends paid 100 132 159 149 299 358 395 445 
Notes:  
Shareholdings as at the financial year-end, 31 March in each year, except for 1978 where 1 September. 
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1 Including non-beneficial holdings. 
2 Sebastian de Ferranti left the board on 16 March 1982. 
3 Abercorn were nominees of Chartered Consolidated Limited. 
Definitions of financial ratios: 
Gearing = net debt*100%/(shareholders’ funds + net debt); negative figure denotes net cash held. 
Dividend payout ratio = ordinary dividends for year*100%/profit for year after extraordinary items and taxation. 
Index of ordinary dividends paid adjusted for share issues, 1978 = 100. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations from: Ferranti, Introduction; Ferranti, Annual Report and Accounts, various years. 
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Table 2. Board size and composition. 
 
Coverage of companies Times 1000 (source: Bank of England) Quoted companies (source: 
Conyon) 
Ferranti 
plc  
 
Ferranti  
International 
Signal plc 
Year/date 1983 1985 1988 
(Times 250) 
1988 1993 
 
31 March 
1987 
31 March 
1988 
Average (Ferranti: actual) number of directors  9.4 9.0 8.9 (10.9) 8.94 8.72 11 15 
Average (Ferranti: actual) number of NEDs 3.1 3.2 3.2 (4.17) 3.51 3.86 4 6 
Average (Ferranti: actual) percentage of 
NEDs  
33% 35% 36% (38%) 38% 44% 36% 40% 
        
Percentage of companies with audit 
committees 
- - 38% (56%) 35% 90% - - 
Percentage of companies with full-time 
chairman with executive responsibilities 
- - 40% (44%) - - - - 
Percentage of companies with chairman and 
chief executive roles split 
- - - 57% 77%   
        
Total number of NEDs - - 1,764 - - - - 
Number of NEDs who were former 
executives of the same company 
- - 235
1 
- - - - 
Number of NEDs with professional 
connection to company 
- - 199
1 
- - - - 
        
Number of companies responding ‘over 700’ 344 549 281-2932 297-3012 - - 
Notes: 
 49 
NEDs = non-executive directors. 
1
There was some (unquantified) overlap between NEDs who were former executives of a company and those who had some professional 
connection to it. 
2
 Number of companies providing usable responses depended on question. 
Sources: Bank of England, “Composition of Company Boards”: 243, Table B, 244, Tables D, E and G; Conyon, “Corporate Governance 
Changes”: 91, 93–94, Tables 1, 2, 3; Ferranti, Annual Report and Accounts, 1987, 1988. 
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